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CONCENTRATION IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY:
EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE?
Ahrcn Johnston
Missouri State University
John Ozment
University of Arkansas

ABSTRACT
The early experience of the airline industry under deregulation was very much as expected, with
increased competition and new entrants offering highly competitive rates. However, there are
approximately 130 airlines operating today, and the industry remains more heavily concentrated than
it was prior to deregulation. This study reports on concentration in the US airline industry between
1970 and 2009, as measured by the Hcrfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and Concentration Ratio,
together with changes in industry costs. The results show a trend of industry-wide reduced costs per
available seat mile that is negatively correlated with the increased level of industry output over the
last 30 years and increased concentration, which demonstrate the need for more research into the
question of scale economies in air transportation.
INTRODUCTION
Prior to passing the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, members of Congress wanted to be
assured that eliminating federal economic
regulation would result in neither destructive
competition, nor increased concentration within
the industry, which could lead to the threat of
monopoly abuse or increased prices. Research
presented before Congress provided a very
convincing argument that neither condition
would develop (U.S. Senate, 1975; U.S. House,
1976; White, 1979; Kyle and Phillips, 1985;
Antoniou, 1991). Moreover, since there was no
investment in the way required, entry was
believed to be relatively easy due to low capital
requirements and the flexibility with which
equipment could be acquired, reassigned, and/or
retired (Harper, 1982; Levine, 1987; Dempsey,
1993). This belief of easy entry was reinforced
by the concept of Contestable Markets, which
suggested that the potential threat of entry could
keep prices down, even in markets with only one
competitor (Baumol, Bailey, and Willig, 1977;
Panzar and Willig, 1977; Bailey and Panzar,
1981). Thus, Congress passed the 1978
legislation with the belief that it would bring

about an increase in the number of competitors
and a decrease in the level of industry
concentration, leading to lower rates and better
service throughout the airline industry.
The early experience after deregulation was very
much as expected. There was a rush of new
entrants into the market, rates became highly
competitive, and the industry became less
concentrated. In 1978, there were 33 airlines
serving U.S. markets (A4A, 1979). In 1979, the
first year after deregulation, 18 new carriers
entered the market and another 13 entered the
following year. By 1985, there were 106 airlines
operating scheduled service in the US. (A4A,
1986). By the end of the decade, however, many
of the new carriers had exited the market and the
industry was more concentrated than ever (Kahn,
1988; Borenstein, 1992; Rakowski and Bejou,
1992; Dempsey, 1993; Brucckner and Spiller,
1994; Goetz and Sutton, 1997). This led Alfred
Kahn, former Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics
Board and one of the strongest proponents of
deregulation, to question the outcome of the
1978 legislation (Kahn, 1988). Others actually
called for re-regulation of the industry
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(McGinley, 1989; Dempsey, 1990; Nomani and
Barrett, 1990). However, there was continued
belief in the positive results of deregulation and
strong support for the new environment
(Gattuso, 1986; GAO, 1991; TRB, 1991), so no
action was taken.
Throughout the 1990s, the trend toward fewer,
larger carriers continued due to bankruptcies and
mergers (TRB, 1999; DOT, 2001); however, new
competitors continued to enter the market, and
the overall number of carriers increased. By
1997, there were 99 airlines servicing U.S.
markets (A4A, 1998), compared to just 66 in
1991 (A4A, 1992). With the new millennium
came additional carriers, and in 2003, 150
airlines were providing service to U.S. markets
(A4A, 2004). As mergers and bankruptcies
reduced the number of carriers, they were
replaced in part by new ones. In 2004, there
were only 139 carriers, but by 2008 the number
was back up to 150 (A4A, 2006, 2009). Still,
questions regarding concentration in the airline
industry have continued, together with persistent
calls for re-regulation (Senate, 2001; Staff, 2001;
USDOJ, 2001; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008;
Lowy, 2010).
Increasing levels of industry concentration seem
contradictory to increasing numbers of
competitors, but studies noting levels of industry
concentration have not been published recently.
Yet levels from the late 1980s and early 1990s
appear to remain valid since complaints against
the industry continue to link bankruptcies and
merger activity to industry concentration and
“unreasonable” fares and poor service (GAO,
2006; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; Lowy,
2010). However, questions arise as to whether
these concerns are justified. Moreover, it is
important to know whether the levels of
concentration in the airline industry have
continued to increase, or if the new carriers
entering the market in recent years have led to
reductions.
This study reports on changes in industry
concentration in the U.S. airline industry
60
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between 1975 and 2009. This study also reports
on changes in industry costs and revenues over
this period. The following section provides a
brief overview of the two most popular measures
of industry concentration, those used in this
study, and a review of previous studies of
concentration in the airline industry. This is
followed by a description of the data, and then
the results of the analysis are presented. Finally,
conclusions and suggestions for future research
are discussed.
MEASURING INDUSTRY
CONCENTRATION
The concept of industrial concentration has been
studied extensively over the years, and many
measures have been proposed. Bikker and Haaf
(2002) reviewed 10 different measures that had
been used in studies of concentration in the
banking industry. The two most common
measures include basic concentration ratios (CR)
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
These measures are discussed briefly below, and
this is followed by a brief review of studies of
industry concentration in the U.S. airline
industry.
Concentration Ratios
Basie concentration ratios (CRk) measure the
proportion of industry revenue earned by the k
largest firms in the industry. The most frequently
used values of k are 4 and 8, providing the fourfirm (CR4) and eight-firm (CR ) measures,
respectively (Bain, 1951, 1954; Scherer and
Ross, 1990; Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Snyman,
2010). Basic concentration ratios are seen as
inferior to other measures of concentration, such
as HHI, because they don't take into account the
behavior of any firms other than the four or eight
largest. Also, many different distributions of
those largest firms would result in equivalent
measures of CR4 and CRs. Despite these
shortcomings, concentration ratios have been
found to correlate highly with the HHI (Scherer
and Ross, 1990) and continue to be used.
Economists researching concentration ratios
have predominately looked for critical values of
measures that are positively correlated with

higher profitability (Schmalensee, 1987; Bikker
and Haaf, 2002). The idea being that when large
firms begin to behave as an oligopoly, their
profitability tends to increase because the large
firms can easily see what their competitors are
charging and charge a similar amount. Several
different numbers have been proposed as the
critical value, but for Clothe critical value
generally is considered to be between 45 and 55
percent, and for CR it is between 60 and 70
percent (Bain, 1951; Meehan and Duchesneau,
1973; Dalton and Penn, 1976).

between 1,000 and 1,800 is considered
moderately concentrated and mergers that create
an increase in HFII greater than 100 points raise
competitive concerns and need to be approved.
Finally, an industry with an HHI greater than
1,800 is considered highly concentrated, and
mergers causing an increase of greater than 50
points raise competitive concerns (USDOJ,
1997). As with concentration ratios, the HFII can
be measured using market shares expressed in
either dollar terms or physical terms, such as
units sold or revenue passenger miles (RPM).

Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is the
sum of the squared market shares for each firm
in a given industry (Rhoades, 1993; Naucnberg,
Basil and Chand, 1997; Bikker and Haaf, 2002).
This gives proportionally greater weight to firms
with large market shares and “reflects both the
distribution of the market shares of the top four
firms and the composition of the market outside
the top four firms” (Rhoades, 1993; USDOJ,
1997).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is
generally accepted as a better measure of
industry concentration than basic CRs, and it is
the measure used by the U.S. Department of
Justice (USDOJ) in determining whether a
proposed merger deserves further investigation
before approval (USDOJ, 1997). The HHI
ranges from 0 to 10,000 for industries ranging
from perfect competition to monopoly. As an
example, an industry with four firms with the
following market shares (40, 30, 20, and 10)
would have a CR4 of 100% and a HHI of 3,000.
If the industry was more concentrated, as with
the following market shares (80, 10, 5, and 1),
the CR, would still be 100%, but the HHI would
be 6,526. Finally, for a monopoly the CR4 would
still be 100%, but the HHI would be 10,000.

STUDIES OF AIRLINE INDUSTRY
CONCENTRATION
By the end of the first decade of deregulation, it
was clear that the industry was changing
dramatically. This prompted a wave of research
assessing the results of deregulation. Several
studies analyzed the effects of mergers and
concentration on fares at the route-level or at
airports/hubs (Hurdle et al., 1989; Borenstein,
1990, 1991, 1992; Joesch and Zick, 1990;
Morrison and Winston, 1990; Abramowitz and
Brown, 1993; Kim and Singal, 1993). These
studies revealed mixed results, such that in some
cases fares were lower in heavily concentrated
markets and in others fares were higher. What
was revealed was that other factors must be
considered together with the level of
concentration. Others studies challenged the
Theory of Contestable Markets, noting that firms
may prevent entry of new carriers without
lowering prices. This could be accomplished by
development of Hub-and-Spoke Systems,
Frequent Flyer Programs, Computerized
Reservation Systems, Travel Agent Commission
Overrides, and control at "Fortress Hubs” of
airport slots and gates (Levine, 1987;
Borenstein, 1989, 1992; Fawcett and Farris,
1989; Hurdle ct al., 1989; Evans and Kessides,
1993b; Joesch and Zick, 1994).

According to the guidelines set forth by the
USDOJ and the Federal Trade Commission, an
industry with an HHI lower than 1,000 is
considered un-concentrated, and mergers need
not be analyzed. An industry with an HHI

Very few studies reported concentration at the
industry level, and most of these studies were
conducted during the wave of research that
assessed the effects of deregulation at the end of
the first decade of experience; very little
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attention has been given to industry-level of
concentration in recent years. Rakowski and
Bejou (1992) showed that in 1977, the largest 15
airlines controlled over 95 percent of the market
in terms of passenger revenues. The largest 8
controlled nearly 80 percent, and the largest four
controlled over half. By 1985, those numbers
were down to 91, 71, and 41, respectively.
However, by 1989 the concentration ratios were
back up above 1977 levels with the largest 15
carriers controlling 99 percent, the largest 8 with
over 91 percent, and the largest 4 at nearly 55
percent.
Borenstein (1992) reported the CR4, CRS, and
HHI for 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1990. The 4-firm
ratios were 56.2, 54.2, 64.8, and 61.5, for 1977,
1982, 1987, and 1990, respectively. The 8-firm
ratios were 81.1, 80.4, 86.5, and 90.5, for those
same years, and the HHIs were 1060, 930, 1230,
and 1210, respectively. Evans and Kessides
(1993a) reported measures of concentration for
the fourth quarters of 1978-1988. The CR4
decreased from the 4th quarter of 1978 to a low
of 38.4 by the 4th quarter of 1985; however by
the 4th quarter of 1988, it was back up to 45.5.
The CRX fell from 77.6 in 1978 to a low of 40.7
in 1985 and then increased to 78.0, its highest
level up to that point. The HHI fell from 930 in
the 4th quarter of 1978 to a low of 630 in 1985,
and rose steadily through 1988 to 870.
Brueckncr and Spiller (1994) showed a similar
pattern of change in industry concentration as
measured by Revenue Passenger Miles. They
reported the CR4 as 59.1, 53.6, and 59.1 for
1979, 1985, and 1988, respectively. Clearly, the
pattern was well established. The initial response
to deregulation was the entry of several new
carriers and more extensive competition, but by
the end of the decade, most of the new carriers
were gone, and the industry was more heavily
concentrated than it was prior to deregulation.
Mergers and bankruptcies have continued to
raise the ire of consumers and public policy
makers (Senate, 2001; Staff, 2001; US DOT,
2001; Isadore, 2007; McGee, 2008; Lowy,
2010), but little is known about the actual levels
62
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of concentration in the industry and its
relationship to overall fare levels and costs.
DATA
The data used in this analysis were obtained
from the annual reports published by the Airlines
for America (A4A). These reports, dating back
to 1937, report information on the general state
of the industry such as total revenue, expenses,
revenue passenger miles (RPM), available seat
miles (ASM), and names of all U.S. carriers with
scheduled passenger service. In addition to this
industry-wide information, similar financial and
production information is reported for the largest
carriers each year dating back to 1970 (A4A,
2009). Table 1 provides an overview of the U.S.
airline industry with respect to the number of
carriers, total passenger revenue, operating profit
and four measures of industry concentration for
the past 40 years. To show trends in pricing and
cost data, it was necessary to adjust dollar
figures for inflation. This was accomplished by
dividing by the implicit price deflator (IPD) as
reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(2011). The specific IPD used was based on
annual GDP with a base year of 2005.
NUMBER OF CARRIERS
An expected result of airline deregulation was an
increase in the number of carriers serving the
U.S. scheduled passenger service market
because of reduced barriers to entry. Figure 1
shows that the number of carriers has increased
dramatically since deregulation. Between 1978
and 1985, there was a significant increase in the
number of carriers with new entrants into the
market; however, during that period there were
also many small carriers that exited the market.
By 1985, 9 of the 34 airlines that existed in 1978
and 11 of the 17 that entered the market in 1979
had exited the market. The number of carriers
peaked in 1985, declined through 1991, and has
trended upward through 2009 with a few minor
declines.
With this significant growth in the number of
carriers, one would expect to see a
corresponding decrease in the concentration of

TABLE 1:
INDUSTRY OVERVIEW
Year

Number

Passenger

Operating

RPM

ASM

of

Revenue

Profit

(Billions)

(Billions)

Carriers

(S Billions)

(S Billions)

CR4

CR8

Mill

Gini
Index

1970

39

31.3

0.2

131.7

264.9

57

83

1,076

78

1971

36

32.2

1.2

135.7

279.9

56

82

1,037

76

1972

34

34.9

2.2

152.4

287.4

57

83

1,056

75

1973

35

36.5

2.1

162.0

310.6

54

83

1,024

76

1974

33

38.7

2.4

162.9

297.0

53

83

1,015

74

1975

34

36.8

0.3

162.8

303.0

53

82

995

74

1976

36

40.2

2.0

179.0

322.8

53

82

992

76

1977

34

43.1

2.4

193.2

345.6

52

81

978

74

1978

34

46.5

3.4

226.8

358.8

53

81

1,004

74

1979

50

52.0

0.5

262.0

416.0

50

79

901

81

1980

61

58.7

-0.5

254.2

431.2

49

80

920

83

1981

86

58.5

-0.8

248.8

432.5

47

76

853

87

1982

93

55.1

-1.3

259.0

424.9

47

77

854

87

1983

95

56.8

0.5

281.3

463.4

48

76

860

86

1984

95

61.8

3.6

304.5

514.0

46

74

817

86

1985

106

63.7

2.3

335.9

547.0

45

73

782

88

1986

98

63.6

2.1

366.3

606.8

48

74

833

87

1987

93

69.3

3.8

404.3

648.4

51

84

989

90

1988

77

75.4

5.2

423.3

648.7

53

85

1,027

89

1989

71

77.2

2.7

432.7

684.4

57

87

1,094

89

1990

67

80.9

-2.6

457.9

733.4

57

88

1,111

89

1991

66

76.2

-2.4

447.8

715.0

63

90

1.230

89

1992

70

78.0

-3.1

478.1

751.8

69

94

1,407

92

1993

80

81.7

1.8

489.1

770.8

69

93

1,407

92

1994

88

81.1

3.5

518.2

783.8

68

91

1,347

92

1995

95

85.1

7.2

540.4

806.6

67

89

1,312

92

1996

97

88.2

7.5

578.4

834.7

66

89

1,280

92

1997

99

93.9

10.2

605.4

860.6

66

89

1,278

92

1998

98

94.6

10.9

619.5

874.2

65

89

1,273

92

1999

94

96.9

9.1

651.6

917.8

64

89

1,233

92

2000

96

105.5

8.0

692.5

956.5

62

88

1,185

91

2001

100

89.2

-11.1

651.7

930.5

64

89

1,244

92

2002

141

79.5

-9.3

639.6

892.7

62

87

1,185

93

2003

150

81.8

-2.3

655.9

893.9

58

83

1,069

92

2004

140

88.5

-1.4

731.9

969.0

57

81

1,029

91

2005

139

93.4

0.3

779.0

1,003.3

55

83

1,028

91

2006

141

98.0

7.3

797.4

1,006.4

54

82

1,007

92

2007

151

100.7

8.7

829.0

1.037.1

53

81

968

91

2008

150

102.8

-3.3

81 1.4

1,020.1

61

83

1,188

92

2009

130

83.2

2.2

769.5

952.2

60

83

1,157

92
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FIGURE 1:
NUMBER OF U.S. AIRLINES 1975-2009

the industry and equality of carriers' market
share, especially if there were no economies of
scale. That is, if all carriers, regardless of size,
had the same costs per unit of output, the
concentration today should be lower than the
concentration was in 1975 because the new
entrants into the market would be able to take
significant amounts of market share from the
industry leaders. This is not the case, however,
and the following sections will illustrate that
industry concentration and inequality has
actually increased over this time period.
CONCENTRATION RATIOS
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the
annual four and eight firm concentration ratios
calculated using market shares measured in both
dollar sales and units sold between 1975 and
2009 as well as the most conservative (highest)
critical values of CRS and the range of critical
values for CR4. From this figure, it is obvious
that the airline industry is currently operating
above these critical values and has been for most
of, if not all of, the past 35 years. This suggests
that the industry is behaving as an Oligopoly and
is a highly concentrated industry. This can be
further verified by the fact that ticket prices for
the same lane among the largest airlines are
64
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generally very similar, and when checked
baggage fees were added in 2009 they were
added for all of the largest airlines, with the
exception of Southwest Airlines, which, as of
2011, doesn't charge a checked baggage fee but
frequently charges slightly higher ticket prices
than the other major national airlines. 1 lowever,
an industry behaving as an oligopoly should
have higher profitability (Bikker and Haaf,
2002), and this is not the case in the U.S. airline
industry, where industry profits per unit of
output have remained fairly constant over the
past 40 years.
HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX
Figure 3 shows the HHI calculated annually for
the U.S. airline industry from market shares
measured in terms of both dollar sales and units
sold. Both methods result in measures of Hill
that are very similar at every point in the sample.
This illustrates that the airline industry is
moderately concentrated and has been for most
of the past 35 years. It is also clear that when the
number of carriers was increasing, between 1978
and 1985, the concentration of the industry was
decreasing. However, when the number of
carriers began decreasing between 1985 and
1991, the concentration increased rapidly, and

FIGURE 2:
ANNUAL CR4 AND CRs of U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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—

2005

2009

CKU Dollars

FIGURE 3:
ANNUAL HER FI N DA H L-HIRSC H.VI AN INDEX (Hill) OF U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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did not decrease dramatically as more carriers
later began to enter the market. Therefore,
despite the fact that there are between 4 and 5
times as many carriers today as there were in
1978, the HHI is actually higher. The large firms
have increased their market share and the small
firms are dividing a decreasing percentage of the
market between them. This indicates that there is
some reason the large firms are able to increase
their power, whether it is due to economies of
scale, scope, or density.
INEQUALITY
When discussing industry concentration, it
makes sense to also discuss the related concept
of inequality of the distribution of market share
of the firms in the industry. A common way to
measure inequality is the Gini index (Damgaard
and Weiner, 2000). The Gini index is based on
Pareto’s law and is the ratio of the area between
a diagonal representing equal distribution and
the Lorenz curve and the area below a diagonal
representing equal distribution. In the Lorenz
curve, individuals are ranked by size, and the
cumulative percentage of carriers is plotted on
the x-axis against the corresponding cumulative
percentage of the market on the y-axis. In figure
4, the Lorenz curve for the U.S. airline industry
in 2009,

To make computation easier and avoid the
estimation of a formula for the Lorenz curve, the
following formula is an unbiased estimator of
the Gini index if the carriers are ranked by size
(Damgaard and Weiner, 2000), wherex. is the
size or market share of each carrier and // is the
average size of all carriers.
2

( )

Figure 5 shows the Gini index tor the U.S.
airline industry for the past forty years calculated
using size measured in both passenger revenue
and RPM. This shows that inequality in the
industry increased significantly immediately
following deregulation and has continued to do
Journal of Transportation Management

so. If there was no benefit to being a larger
carrier (no returns to scale or scope), we would
expect to see the industry approaching a more
equitable distribution of the market when in fact
the opposite has been the case. Furthermore, the
correlation between the Gini index and number
of carriers is 0.8165, indicating that as the
number of carriers increases so does the
inequality in market share between carriers.
These multiple measures of industry
concentration and inequality were examined to
clearly illustrate that the concentration of the
U.S. airline industry has been increasing since
deregulation despite the fact that there has been
a substantial increase in the number of firms.
While this alone, does not indicate economies of
scale or scope, it certainly raises questions as to
how the largest firms have been able to maintain
control of the marketplace and actually increase
market share w ith the near constant introduction
of new competitors. One possible explanation
might be that operating costs per unit of output
are actually lower for the larger carriers. If this
explanation is accurate, it would indicate the
presence of economies of scale, economies of
scope, or both in the airline industry.
COSTAND REVENUE PER PASSENGER
MILE (RPM)
Since 1975, there has been an increase in the
size of the airline industry as a whole. This can
be measured by revenue (dollar sales). RPM
(unit sales), or ASM (output). All three measures
have shown an increasing trend since 1975 and
can be seen in Figure 6. In order to fit data of
differing scales on the same graph and show the
increasing trends more clearly, revenue, RPM,
and ASM have been indexed with a base year of
1975 by dividing each year’s value by the value
from 1975. The revenue values were adjusted for
inflation before being indexed. Figure 6 clearly
shows an increasing trend in the size of the U.S.
airline industry, but it also shows that output and
units sold have been increasing more rapidly
than revenue. This is another indication of scale
economies and shows that costs have risen less
quickly than output.

FIGURE 4:
CALCULATION OF THE GINI INDEX

FIGURE 5:
GINI INDEX OF U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
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Figure 7 shows the increase in billions of RPM
sold for what are, as of 2010, the three largest
airlines in the U.S. (United, American, and
Delta) for each year between 1975 and 2009.
This figure illustrates that not only has the entire
industry been increasing in size, but the largest
firms have also been increasing. Figure 7 also
shows that the period from 1979-1985 resulted
in a relative lack of growth for these three
carriers while the industry as a whole was
growing. This lack of growth for the large
carriers as the industry grew corresponds to what
was shown in figures 1-3, that the number of
firms increased in this time period and the
industry concentration, as measured by CR4,
CRS, and HHI, decreased.
Correlated to the growth of the industry was an
equally impressive decrease in both expenses
and revenue per RPM and ASM. This can be
seen in Figure 8. This figure is based on
monetary figures, which were adjusted for
inflation by dividing each year’s observation by

the corresponding I PD. This is another indicator
that economies of scale or scope may exist in the
airline industry. The correlation between
industry output (measured in either RPM or
ASM) and expenses per RPM is -0.86.
However, the fact that revenue per unit of output
has decreased at nearly the same rate indicates
that the carriers do not appear to be acting as
though they are market leaders in a concentrated
industry. Actually, the correlation between sales
per RPM and output is even higher at -0.96,
indicating that the price of air travel has
decreased more quickly than the cost of
providing air travel. For those interested in re
regulation, this raises the question of whether the
current state of the industry and competition is
bad for the consumer. Presumably the role of
regulation would be to help the consumer and
maintain competitiveness in the industry.
However, the industry seems to be lowering
prices even faster than expenses, suggesting that
competition is keeping prices low despite high
levels of industry concentration.

FIGURE 6:
ANNUAL INDEXED MEASURES OF INDUSTRY SIZE (1970=1)
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FIGURE 7:
ANNUAL RPM (BILLIONS) OF 2009’s 3 LARGEST CARRIERS

2000

United

FIGURE S:
REVENUE, EXPENSES, AND PROFIT PER REVENUE PASSENGER MILE
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The bottom line on Figure 8 illustrates the profit
per RPM, and this measure has stayed fairly
stable over the past 35 years. In fact, the entire
industry lost money 11 out of the past 35 years.
If this is a result of destructive competition,
there may be a need for regulation simply to
keep the large carriers from losing money or
requiring governmental monetary intervention to
avoid bankruptcy. The entire industry has lost
approximately $9 Billion since 2001. However,
this is more likely the result of a few large firms
losing a lot of money rather than all of the major
carriers losing money. Based on information
from their annual reports to the SEC, America
West and U.S. Airways combined, pre-merge,
and post merge losses since 2001 have totaled
close to $8 Billion, leading to the conclusion that
the rest of the industry only lost $1 Billion; this
includes at least 40 bankruptcies, with at least 12
of the bankruptcies resulting in the cessation of
operations.
These findings support reregulation of the airline
industry in that they provide evidence of
economies of scale, and a major reason for
deregulation was a multitude of studies showing
a lack of scale economies in the industry. The
industry has concentration ratios indicating that
it should be behaving as an oligopoly, all
measures of concentration show increased
concentration ratios since deregulation, and cost
per unit of output has steadily decreased as
output has increased. Contrary to this evidence is
the fact that price per unit of output has
decreased even faster than costs. This reduced
price is beneficial to consumers as long as
destructive competition does not drive prices
down so far that the established carriers are
forced out of business. However, it has been
pointed out that the majority of industry losses
over the past 9 years have been the result of two
carriers who merged.
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
The final piece of evidence that there may be
economies of scale in the U.S. airline industry is
the recent abundance of mergers and
acquisitions. If there are no cost benefits from
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increased size of operations, why are there so
many mergers? The following is an account of
some of the recent mergers: American Airlines
purchased the assets of the bankrupt Trans World
Airlines in 2001. America West and U.S.
Airways (both with recent bankruptcies) merged
in 2005 and integrated their operations in 2008.
Delta and Northwest merged in 2008. United
Airlines and Continental Airlines merged in
October of 2010. ExpressJet Airlines merged
with Sky West/ASA in November of 2010.
Finally, Southwest Airlines announced a merger
with AirTran Airways in September of 2010
which was finalized May 2, 2011.
While many carriers are merging operations,
there are also several instances of a single
holding company owning multiple carriers. This
would further suggest that the carriers see no
possibility of economies of scale. However, in
some cases, these are the same companies that
were previously mentioned. For example, Delta
Airlines owns Comair and operates it separately;
AMR Corporation owns American Airlines,
American Eagle, and Executive Airlines; U.S.
Airways Group owns U.S. Airways, Piedmont
Airline, Inc., and PSA Airlines; and Republic
Airline Holding owns Frontier, Republic, Shuttle
America, Chatauqua, and Midwest. This
indicates that mergers may not be attempts to
exploit economies of scale but may be due to
some other rationale.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper is intended to investigate the state of
the airline industry, show its increasing level of
concentration, and point out the need for further
investigation into the existence of scale
economies. Whether industry concentration is
measured by concentration ratios or the HHI, the
U.S. airline industry has been increasing in
concentration while also increasing in size and
number of carriers. The fact that large carriers
can increase market share in the presence of
increased competition seems to suggest the
existence of scale economies. Costs per unit of
output have been steadily decreasing as industry
output and output of the largest carriers has

increased. This is yet another indicator that scale
economies may exist. Finally, some air carriers
behave as though they will see a benefit from
merging with other carriers, indicating a belief or
hope that scale economies exist, while other
companies own multiple carriers without
merging operations, indicating that they see no
benefit from increasing the size of operations.
For this reason alone, it may be time to
reinvestigate the existence of scale economies in
the U.S. airline industry, so airline holding
companies will know if they could expect to see
reduced cost from merging operations instead of
operating multiple carriers.
For all of these reasons, the apparent shifts in
market structure as seen by changes in equality
in Figure 5, and the recent calls for re-regulation;
it seems as though there exists a need for further
investigation into the presence or absence of
economies of scale and scope in the U.S. airline
industry. Further validating this argument, is the
fact that the most recently published study into
this matter, while published in 2001, used data
from 1983-1989 (Creel and Farrell, 2001). This
means that an additional 20 years of available
data has not been included in any previous
studies on scale economies in the U.S. airline
industry. It is time for a thorough study using the
most up to date information to investigate the
existence of economies of scale, scope, and
density.
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